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338 Abstract
This paper examines the major determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows in 26 European Union (EU) countries using panel data. Our empirical 
study takes a different approach by separating European countries into two 
groups: Western (EU-15) countries and Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. The results from the panel data analysis of FDI inflows to 26 EU coun-
tries for the period 1994-2012 show that: (1) traditional location variables such 
as market size, trade openness, unemployment, infrastructure, tax rate and unit 
 labour costs are able, to a large extent, to explain FDI flows to both groups of 
countries; (2) there are country-specific factors such as economic growth, unit 
labour costs and credit risk that contribute to the differences in FDI patterns 
across EU-15 and CEECs; and (3) policy and institutional quality factors are 
found to play an important role for both groups of countries. When analyzing host 
countries based on their relative level of performance, we find that the top ten FDI 
performers are able to attract a significant amount of FDI because of their macro-
economic stability and high level of institutional development, while for EU coun-
tries with low FDI dominance, policy and institutional risk factors play a more 
important role. 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, transition economy, gravity model, institu-
tional quality 
1 IntroductIon
This paper investigates the relative importance of different macroeconomic, policy 
and institutional factors as determinants of FDI inflows into the transition econo-
mies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and compares them with the more de-
veloped Western European countries. All of the CEE countries have undergone 
significant changes in their political regimes in the last twenty years. They trans-
formed themselves within a short period of time from planned and government-
controlled economies to ones where private business is encouraged and competi-
tion accepted. The need for extensive enterprise restructuring and modernization in 
view of limited domestic resources created environments where the potential ben-
efits of foreign direct investment (FDI) are especially valuable. Also, transition 
economies are well placed to benefit from the technology and knowledge transfer 
associated with FDI (Demekas et al., 2005; Torlak, 2004). It is widely believed that 
these benefits outweigh any possible drawbacks – such as a loss of economic inde-
pendence or increasing industrial concentration when a single multinational firm 
achieves a dominant position in an industry (Johnson, 2006).1 
Almost non-existent at the beginning of the 1990s, the FDI inflow to the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) has exploded in the last ten years (Hen-
1 Some researchers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Schoors and Van der Tol, 2002) argue that at least in the 
initial stages of development or transition, FDI could have a negative impact on the recipient economy. If 
domestic firms are so unproductive in comparison with foreign-owned firms, the former may be driven out 
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339riot, 2005). More recent data show that the Central and Eastern Europe region 
experienced a five-fold increase in foreign direct investment inflows between 
2003 and 2008, rising from US$30 billion to US$155 billion (Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, 2010). Russia was the destination which attracted much of this addi-
tional investment as its inflows rose from less than US$8 billion in 2003 to more 
than US$70 billion in 2008. The credit crunch and recession that followed coin-
cided with a collapse of FDI inflows to the CEE countries. According to the same 
report, FDI inflows in the region as a whole were 50% lower in 2009 than in 2008. 
The year 2012 saw the re-emergence of CEE FDI flows on the back of large job- 
-intensive projects, notably in Poland, Russia, Serbia and Turkey (Ernst & Young, 
2013). As a consequence, CEE overtook Western Europe to become the leading 
destination for FDI jobs in Europe.2
Simultaneously, the more developed Western European countries have received 
much larger FDI flows than transition economies (World Bank, 2014a). Most of 
these countries offer incentives to foreign investors in the form of preferential tax 
rates, tax holidays, special depreciation schemes, social security relief, special tax 
deductible items and exemptions from tariff payments. These are all intended to 
encourage FDI, although the empirical evidence for such an impact is limited. The 
existence of incentives can be justified by the externalities that accompany FDI.3 
Geographical differences within Europe became more pronounced in the last two 
years (2012-2013). Ernst & Young’s attractiveness survey (2013) shows that 
Western Europe drew three-quarters of all FDI projects in 2012, yet more than 
half of the FDI jobs were created in Central and Eastern Europe. CEE is reaping 
the benefits of an affordable and capable labour force and its cost base remains 
competitive compared with Western Europe.
The forces driving the FDI flows into the CEE countries have been intensely ana-
lysed in the economics literature. There are numerous empirical studies which de-
scribe the specific role of different groups of factors like transition-specific factors 
(Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Mateev, 2012), economic development (Henriot, 
2005), economic reforms (Stoian and Vickerman, 2005), exchange rate regime 
(Aubin et al., 2006), wage differentials (Dupuch and Milan, 2003), and announce-
ments related to EU accession (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). At the same time the 
theoretical foundations and evidence from other regions can offer little insight into 
the impact of certain factors specific to the transition process on FDI flows. Taken 
2 Europe is still the world’s top destination, with 22.4% of global FDI value, although its share has diminished 
by 6 points since 2011. This is partly due to a prolonged Eurozone crisis impacting investors’ confidence and 
risk appetite, but is also in line with a broader shift of focus toward developing and transition economies, 
which, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), secured in 2012 
more FDI (52.1%) than the developed world.
3 There is a widespread belief that foreign direct investment enhances the productivity of host countries and 
promotes economic development. This notion stems from the fact that FDI may not only provide direct capital 
financing but also create positive externalities via the adoption of foreign technology and know-how. Positive 
productivity spillover effects are found only for the developed countries (see Gorg and Strobl, 2002 for Ireland; 































































38 (3) 337-374 (2014)
340 from the behavioural and institutional points of view, CEE countries are very dif-
ferent from both developing countries and industrially advanced countries. The 
speed with which market-oriented policies and legal reforms conducive to foreign 
firms were introduced proved to have an important role in explaining FDI. The 
significance of the privatization process in the early FDI flows should also be taken 
into account. The financial system stability represents an attractive factor for for-
eign investors and can also be considered an important FDI determinant.
Our research has two goals. First, we analyze the relative importance of FDI deter-
minants that may explain the different sizes of foreign investment flows into more 
and less developed European countries (EU-15 and CEE countries). Second, we 
compare the 26 EU countries based on their relative FDI performance in order to 
find important macroeconomic, policy and institutional quality factors that may 
explain the differences in the level of FDI performance among European countries. 
Thus, our main findings reinforce the argument that the traditional location factors 
are able to explain the differences in FDI patterns across European countries but 
when the level of FDI performance is compared, a number of specific determining 
factors are expected to play a more important role. To the best of our knowledge 
this is the only paper to address this issue in the empirical literature on FDI.
In this paper we use a unique panel dataset covering 26 EU countries between 
1994 and 2012. The results show that the main determinants of FDI inflows to 
these countries when taken as a homogenous group are market size, trade open-
ness, unemployment rate, infrastructure endowment, unit labour costs and tax bur-
den. Political and institutional risk factors also play a significant role in explaining 
FDI in Europe. When investigating FDI patterns across different groups of Euro-
pean countries (EU-15 and CEE countries), we find that country-specific factors 
such as growth in GDP, unit labour costs and credit risk seem to contribute to the 
differences in FDI flows attracted by each group of countries. The results also 
show that the top ten FDI performers are able to attract significant amounts of FDI 
because of their macroeconomic stability and high level of institutional develop-
ment. In contrast, for the group of countries with low FDI dominance, we find that 
policy and institutional quality factors do play a more important role in explaining 
FDI; credit risk and quality of institutions are significant determinants of FDI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines our concep-
tual framework and summarises the theory on the determinants of FDI. The econo-
metric model and data analysis are presented in section three. Section four presents 
econometric results from FDI panel regressions. Some concluding remarks are 
offered in the final section.
2 LIterAture revIew: determInAnts of fdI 
It has long been recognized that the benefits of FDI for the host country can be sig-
nificant, including knowledge and technology transfer to domestic firms and the la-
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341exports abroad, notably in the source country. The impact of FDI on the host econ-
omy depends on the type of FDI. Three different types of FDI were identified: mar-
ket-seeking FDI (horizontal FDI), resource-asset seeking FDI, and finally, effici-
ency-seeking FDI (vertical FDI). The purpose of market-seeking FDI is to serve 
local and regional markets. It is also called horizontal FDI, as it involves the replica-
tion of production facilities in the host country. Tariff-jumping or export-substitut-
ing FDI is a variant of this type of FDI. Because the reason for horizontal FDI is to 
serve a local market better by local production, market size and market growth of 
the host economy are the main drivers. Impediments to accessing local markets, 
such as tariffs and transport costs, also encourage this type of FDI.
The second type, resource or asset seeking FDI, is observed when firms invest 
abroad to acquire resources not available in the home country, such as natural re-
sources, raw materials, or low-cost labour. Especially in the manufacturing sector, 
when multinational firms directly invest in order to export, factor-cost considera-
tions become important. In contrast to horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented 
FDI involves relocating parts of the production chain to the host country. Availa-
bility of low-cost labour is a prime driver for export-oriented FDI. Moreover, FDI 
in the resource sector, such as oil and natural gas, is attracted to countries with 
abundant natural endowments. The third type of FDI, called efficiency-seeking, 
occurs when the firm can gain from the common governance of geographically 
dispersed activities in the presence of economies of scale and scope. In this case, 
prior to making a decision, foreign investors consider the price of the factors of 
production (adjusted for productivity differences) and the membership in regional 
integration agreements. Prospective membership in the EU, which is conductive 
to the establishment of regional corporate networks, seems to have attracted more 
efficiency-seeking FDI to transition economies after the initial announcement of 
the progress of EU accession.4
Foreign direct investment represents an important source of finance for both de-
veloped and developing countries but most of FDI inflows and outflows are con-
centrated within the developed countries. Empirical research on foreign invest-
ment finds that FDI inflows to less developed countries are usually associated with 
vertical investments (Carr et al., 1998; Marakusen et al., 1996). Vertical FDI takes 
place when a firm relocates only a part of its production process, and not the whole 
production. In many cases, it is the relocation of the labour-intensive activities in 
low wage countries. This process tends to reduce the labour intensity of the home 
country domestic production. FDI inflows to developed (industrially advanced) 
countries are usually horizontal investments driven by market-seeking strategies, 
and they tend to increase the labour intensity of the home country domestic pro-
duction (Mariotti et al., 2003). Therefore, horizontal investments replicate the 
4 It must be said that market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI do not exclude each other. If the market-seek-
ing FDI has a penetration logic (it looks for the market size and market parts), the efficiency-seeking FDI and 
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342 complete production process of the home country in a foreign country. Horizontal 
FDI seeks to take advantage of a new large market, which is considered a tradi-
tional motive for FDI. In recent years, the determinants of and motivation for FDI 
in developing countries (including transition economies) have changed in the 
process of globalization.5 
FDI is a rather complex economic phenomenon which depends on many factors 
whose relative importance may change as the economic environment evolves over 
time; so it is possible that as the economy of the host country changes and the in-
ternational environment evolves, the factors motivating FDI also change. Even 
though the traditional determinants and the types of FDI associated with them 
have not disappeared with globalization, their importance is declining (Nun-
nenkamp, 2002). For example, one of the most important traditional FDI determi-
nants, market size, has decreased in importance, while at the same time new deter-
minants have emerged. Cost differences between locations, the quality of infra-
structure, the ease of doing business and the availability of skills have increased 
in importance (Botrić and Škuflić, 2006). This reveals that investors’ motives are 
changing, and consequently countries must seek new ways to attract FDI.
There is a growing body of research literature that provides empirical evidence 
about the factors determining the patterns of FDI in different countries and re-
gions, including Europe.6 When it comes to the analysis of FDI directed to CEE 
countries, the two main approaches that have been used are survey-type studies 
and formal quantitative analyses (Benacek et al., 2000). Quantitative studies on 
the determinants of FDI are based on a number of different models, but the grav-
ity approach is the most commonly used in practice. According to Demekas et al. 
(2005) gravity factors consistently explain about 60 percent of aggregate FDI 
flows, regardless of the region.7 Policy and institutional environment also matter 
for FDI. For example, Janicki and Wunnava (2004) find that international trade is 
perhaps the most important determinant of foreign direct investment in the CEE 
region, while Carstensen and Toubal (2004) argue that comparative advantages 
like low relative unit labour costs, corporate tax rates and relative endowments 
5 According to Dunning (2002), FDI in developing countries has shifted from market-seeking and resource-
seeking FDI to more (vertical) efficiency-seeking FDI. Due to globalization-induced pressure on prices, mul-
tinational enterprises (MNEs) are expected to relocate some of their production facilities to low (real) cost 
developing countries. Nevertheless, and in contrast to FDI in industrial countries, FDI in developing countries 
still is directed predominantly to accessing natural resources and national or regional markets.
6 The majority of previous work in this area reports two groups of explanatory factors: gravity factors (prox-
imity, market size) and factor endowments (infrastructure, human capital). Though there has been consider-
able theoretical work on foreign direct investment (for a literature review see Alfaro et al., 2006; Blonigen, 
2005; Nonnemberg and Mendonça, 2004; and Vavilov, 2005), there is no agreed model providing the basis 
for empirical work. Rather, the eclectic paradigm, also known as OLI framework (Dunning, 1988, 1992), has 
been largely employed in research literature as a general tool of reference for explaining the FDI patterns of 
multinational enterprises.
7 Following LeSage and Pace (2008), Leibrecht and Riedi (2010) extent the frequently used gravity model 
via the inclusion of spatial interaction effects across home countries of FDI as well as across host countries. 
Moreover, they consider the host country’s surrounding market potential as a determinant of FDI flows. This 
variable captures the possibility that the market size of proximate countries may impact on the volume of FDI 
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343also exert a significant influence. In our paper, we undertake the second approach, 
based on a comparative panel data analysis.
The gravity model rests on the assumption that FDI flows are larger between large 
economies and even more if the countries are close neighbours. The GDP-related 
core gravity variables (GDP of home country and GDP of host country) capture 
size effects: the larger the home country of FDI, the more FDI should emerge from 
this country; the larger the market size of a host country, the more FDI it should 
receive. Thus, the two variables are positively correlated with FDI. Following 
previous empirical research into host country determinants of FDI (Altomononte 
and Guagliano, 2003; Demekas et al., 2005) we include two proxy variables for 
market size – gross domestic product and population – in the panel data analysis. 
Nominal (or real) GDP is traditionally used as a proxy for the market size of the 
host country, while growth rate in GDP is used as a measure of the quality of the 
market demand in the same country. The two variables will indicate the impor-
tance of market-seeking FDI in a host country. We expect a positive correlation 
between a host country’s market size and FDI. As our analysis is based on FDI net 
inflows to the host country, we do not include source country’s GDP as an ex-
planatory variable.
Distance has long been used successfully as a variable in gravity models explain-
ing international trade. In these models distance functions as a proxy for transpor-
tation costs but also as a proxy for the affinity between the trading economies. 
Affinity is determined by geographical proximity and similarities in culture and 
language. A high affinity implies that economic interaction between the countries 
(such as trade or FDI) can occur with reduced friction (Johansson and Westin, 
1994). From a theoretical point of view, the sign on the distance variable is am-
biguous a priori (Markusen and Maskus, 2002), depending on the motive for 
FDI.8 While large distance may encourage FDI due to an internalization advan-
tage, it also may discourage FDI due to the lack of market know-how, higher com-
munication and information costs, and differences in culture and institutions 
(Buch et al., 2004, 2005). However, if the investor’s host-country affiliates are 
relatively new, as is often the case in the Central and Eastern European countries, 
they typically depend on headquarter services and intermediate inputs supplied by 
the parent firm. Therefore, even in the case of horizontal FDI to the CEE coun-
tries, a negative impact of distance on FDI is plausible. 
Several previous studies (Altomonte, 1998; Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Bos and Van de 
Laar, 2004; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004) have suggested that trade limitations have 
8 Johnson (2006) argues that distance should have a negative effect on market-seeking FDI. Increasing dis-
tance implies lower affinity, resulting in higher costs of investment and more costly adaptation of goods to 
local preferences. Efficiency-seeking FDI is likely to be affected negatively by distance for the case where the 
components produced in the host country are shipped back to the source country, since transportation costs 
increase with distance. Distance can be argued to be relatively unimportant for resource-seeking investment. 
Resource-seeking MNEs are attracted to a limited number of geographical locations where the needed resource 
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344 also had significant impact on the size of FDI flows. Factors such as trade openness 
are of major importance to investors who usually prefer countries with relatively 
liberal trade regimes. It is widely argued that FDI and openness of the economy 
should be positively related as the latter in part proxies the liberality of the trade 
regime in the host country, and in part – the higher propensity for multinational firms 
to export.9 Following Deichman (2001), Falk and Hake (2008), and Holland and 
Pain (1998) we include a proxy variable (import plus export as a percent of GDP) to 
assess the relative effect of trade openness on FDI flows. The expected effects may 
differ by the type of investment regarding local market or export orientation, the 
host country’s foreign exchange control laws and applied capital taxation. However, 
for our sample of 26 EU countries, we should expect trade openness to indicate also 
the level of integration of the local economy into the regional economic flows. 
Therefore, trade openness will have a positive impact on FDI.
The prospects for political and macroeconomic stability together with the trans-
parency of the legal regulations governing factors, such as foreign ownership of 
land and profit repatriation, all matter to potential investors and the risk must be 
compensated for by higher expected gains (Jun and Singh, 1996). Usually foreign 
companies look for resources availability, high productivity, reduced unit labour 
costs, but also for well-established financial institutions providing full banking 
services as well as well-developed security markets. Thus, financial system stabil-
ity and the level of credit activities in a host country represent attractive factors for 
foreign investors and can be considered important determinants of FDI (Albulesku 
et al., 2010). In this study, we use the volume of domestic credits to the private 
sector as a share of GDP to proxy the credit activities in a host country. We expect 
a positive relationship between this variable and FDI.10 
Furthermore, the existence of a developed and effective infrastructure is necessary 
for the operations of MNEs since it reduces costs of distribution, transportation 
and production, thereby affecting comparative and absolute advantage of the host 
country. Bellak et al. (2009) find evidence that FDI in CEE countries is attracted 
by increases in infrastructure endowment; information and telecommunication in-
frastructure as well as transport infrastructure impact positively on FDI. Different 
studies of FDI use different proxies for infrastructure.11 For example, Demekas et 
al. (2007) include an indicator of infrastructure reform from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This index reflects the state of 
9 Trade policies and, more broadly, trade costs (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and transportation costs) are generally 
found to have a significant impact on FDI flows, but in aggregate regressions their sign is ambiguous. This is 
probably due to the different effect the barriers to trade can be expected to have on horizontal and vertical FDI; 
they tend to attract horizontal FDI, which aims at penetrating the domestic market, but repel vertical FDI.
10 Our preliminary tests find this variable to be a weak proxy for credit activities (and financial stability) in a 
host country. The variable shows insignificant in all model specifications.
11 Goodspeed et al. (2006) explain FDI in a broad range of countries and include the consumption of electric 
power, the number of mainline telephone connections and a composite infrastructure index in their regres-
sions. In a related paper Goodspeed et al. (2010) find that a favourable infrastructure endowment attracts FDI 
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345regulation of infrastructure services (EBRD, 2004). The study finds that, for the 
less developed economies in their sample, infrastructure is an important determi-
nant of FDI, while it becomes insignificant for the more developed countries. 
Campos and Kinoshita (2003) use the number of mainline telephone connections 
as a proxy for infrastructure. A positive impact on FDI is found only for the former 
Soviet Union countries. In this study we use total telephone lines per 100 people 
to account for the quality and availability of infrastructure services in a host coun-
try. As favourable infrastructure endowment attracts FDI to both developed and 
less developed countries, we expect a positive influence on FDI.
Empirical research finds that the choice of an investment location is driven by 
total labour costs as well as labour productivity. The indicators of labour costs 
used in empirical studies can be classified into three major groups: total labour 
costs, gross wages and unit labour costs (see Bellak et al., 2008 for a comprehen-
sive survey of existing studies in the field).12 Although the various measures can 
be classified into these three groups, the exact definition of the measures applied 
differs widely within each category. Consequently, the empirical studies show a 
wide variety of results with respect to the size and significance of the coefficient 
of the labour cost proxy used. Most of them report a negative impact of labour 
costs on FDI, while Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) finds a significant positive sign for 
the unit labour cost variable in a study on regional FDI in Hungary. 
Since our sample includes both well-developed and developing (transition) econ-
omies we expect the difference between gross wages and total labour costs to vary 
substantially in different European countries. If foreign investors are seeking low 
labour costs, the availability of cheap labour will be an important factor affecting 
FDI. However, firms only prefer low wage locations if the reduced labour costs 
are not compensated by lower labour productivity, or an overvalued currency. Fol-
lowing Carstensen and Toubal (2004) we use monthly average gross wages as a 
share of GDP per employment to proxy the unit labour costs in a host country. A 
rise in wages increases, ceteris paribus, unit production costs, and therefore, de-
creases FDI. Therefore, we may expect a negative relationship between this vari-
able and FDI, although a positive-signed coefficient is plausible.13
Previous studies of FDI in developing countries have put particular stress on the 
indicators of economic and political risk (Lucas, 1993; Singh and Jun, 1996). This 
12 The literature using unit labour costs is heterogenous concerning the operationalisation of labour costs. For 
example, Bevan and Estrin (2004) use annual average wages in the manufacturing sector as a proxy for total 
labour costs and nominal GDP per capita as a proxy for labour productivity. In contrast, Carstensen and Tou-
bal (2004) employ differences in unit labour costs between home and host countries calculated as monthly 
average gross wages over nominal GDP per employment.
13 Since labour costs in the transition economies appear to be very low, it is likely that they would generate 
efficiency-seeking FDI from MNEs in countries that have higher labour costs. At the same time one should 
recognize the fact that low wages do not necessarily reflect low production costs because labour productivity 
may be low. Taking this into account, the location decision of a multinational enterprise depends on the rela-
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346 comprises three main elements: (a) macroeconomic stability, e.g., growth, infla-
tion, exchange rate risk; (b) institutional stability such as policies towards FDI, tax 
regimes, the transparency of legal regulations and the scale of corruption; and (c) 
political stability, ranging from indicators of political freedom to measures of sur-
veillance and revolutions. In general, it might be expected that FDI is more likely 
to flow from developed countries into developing economies that are politically 
stable and have access to large, regional markets. In this study the institutional 
stability is proxied by corruption and a composite variable for the quality of insti-
tutions. Previous studies of the relationship between corruption and FDI (Deme-
kas et al., 2005; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Stoian and Filippaios, 2007) indicate 
that a high level of corruption can have a negative effect on the volume of FDI 
flows since it increases the costs of operation in the host country for foreign inves-
tors and reduces the profitability of investment. Following Pournarakis and Var-
sakelis (2004) we use the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (TI) as a proxy for the severity of corruption. Pursuant to previous empirical 
findings, we expect a negative correlation of this variable with FDI.
To account for the institutional quality effects we use the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which include six measures: political stability, gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and 
voice and accountability. The perception of political stability (and risk) is measured 
through Moody’s Sovereign Credit Rating, which inter alia captures the likelihood 
of expropriation of assets and other forms in which a weak institutional environment 
is manifested. Less political risk should lead to more FDI. Due to the particular 
definition of the measure of risk (see appendix A) we expect a positive correlation 
with FDI, that is, the higher the country risk index, or the less risky the investment 
environment, the more attractive a country is for FDI. Following previous empirical 
studies we introduce a second proxy for credit risk – a country’s credit default swap 
(CDS) spread – which is found to be negatively correlated with FDI.
We use two additional variables (unemployment rate and statutory corporate in-
come tax rate) to capture the effect of any economic changes that might influence 
overall economic activity, and FDI in particular. Less unemployment should im-
ply larger investment flows; thus, we expect negative correlation with FDI.14 Pre-
vious empirical studies (see Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009) show that low (effective 
average) corporate tax rates indeed attract FDI in general, and FDI in CEE coun-
tries, in particular. Thus, a negative relationship between the tax rate and FDI is 
expected.15
14 It’s axiomatic that a higher unemployment rate should discourage FDI. One might consider that a high unem-
ployment rate might mean that a unit labour cost advantage of the host country might be long-lasting, since the 
labour demand would have to expand tremendously before any pressure for wage inflation would be present.
15 From an empirical viewpoint, corporate income taxes do indeed matter for investment location decisions 
of MNEs. For example, De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) carry out a meta-analysis of 35 empirical studies and 
find a median tax-rate elasticity (semi-elasticity) of FDI of about -2.9. However, the typical tax-rate elasticity 
crucially depends on the tax measure used and the operationalisation of FDI applied. Concerning tax rates, 
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3473 empIrIcAL specIfIcAtIon 
This study aims to reveal whether the traditional (location) characteristics can 
explain the differences in FDI in different groups of EU countries. Therefore, the 
central research question to be answered can be formulated as follows: Can the 
traditional factors – identified by the existing empirical literature – be applied to 
less developed transition economies, or are there other determinants (e.g., policy 
and institutional risk factors) that explain the different attractiveness of the two 
groups of European countries? This question will be investigated by analyzing 
FDI to a group of 26 EU countries covering the period 1994-2012. In this study 
we take a different approach – the whole sample of European countries is divided 
into two groups, Western European countries (EU-15) and Central and Eastern 
European countries16, and they are analyzed separately. Then, we rank the host 
countries in our sample based on their relative FDI performance and investigate 
the marginal effect of different macroeconomic, policy and institutional quality 
factors on FDI in each group of countries. To explain the differences in FDI across 
Western and Eastern European countries we test two research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Since the two groups of European countries – the more developed 
Western countries and the CEE countries – are geographically close and share 
similar market features, there should be a group of common factors that explain 
FDI inflows to these two regions.
Hypothesis 2: Since the differences in FDI pattern across the two groups of 
countries may be due to different macroeconomic, policy and institutional fac-
tors, the more developed the institutional and policy environment in a host coun-
try is, the larger the FDI dominance of this country over the countries with less-
developed environments.
3.1 dependent vArIAbLe
The dependent variable is FDI net inflows per year (in current U.S. dollars). A 
sample of 26 European host countries, including 15 Western countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom17) and 11 Central and 
Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) is examined to 
empirically test the determinants of FDI flows. The analysis uses logarithm of FDI 
inflows to adjust for the skewed nature of the data; other studies of FDI determi-
nants in transition economies undertake similar treatments of the dependent 
variable (see Demekas et al., 2005). The analysis also incorporates FDI inflow for 
the previous year as an independent variable. Substantively, the lagged depend-
ent variable accounts for the path-dependent nature of FDI flows; that is, coun-
16 According to UNCTAD statistics, CEE countries include 19 ex-centrally planned economies and cover also 
the group of Southeastern European countries included in our sample.
17 Malta and Cyprus are excluded from the group of Western countries as they do not belong to the original 
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348 tries that have received FDI in the past may be more likely to receive it in the 
present year. Methodologically, the lagged dependent variable helps to control for 
serial correlation.
3.2 expLAnAtory vArIAbLes
Two main assumptions for the choice of explanatory variables to be used in the 
empirical analysis emerge from the preceding discussions (see section 2). First, in 
order to better understand the determinants of FDI, it is crucial to specify an em-
pirical model that allows for a combination of traditional (market size, distance, 
trade costs, and relative factor endowments), and more country-specific determin-
ing factors (risk, corruption and quality of institutions). All of these variables are 
closely related to the theoretical models that explain the attractiveness of a coun-
try as an FDI destination. Second, European countries are far from being homoge-
neous. Both the level of economic development and the size of FDI differ across 
different groups of countries (EU-15 and CEECs). Hence, the key question we 
address in this paper is how important the traditional determinants are in explain-
ing the FDI pattern into more and less developed EU countries, and what specific 
factors contribute to the FDI dominance of EU-15 over CEE countries.
As noted earlier, market-seeking FDI is to serve the host country market. Market 
size is a measure of market demand in the country. We expect FDI flows to be 
greater in countries with a larger domestic market. Following previous research 
on FDI we use real GDP rather than nominal GDP as a proxy for market size, as 
the large fall in output that characterised the first years of transition (1994-1997) 
could result in a strange relationship between GDP and FDI inflows. We use pop-
ulation (POP) as a second proxy for the market size of a host country. We expect 
both variables to have a strong positive influence on FDI. We also use annual real 
growth rate in GDP (GDP_G) as a proxy for the market potential of a host coun-
try.18 In line with previous empirical studies this variable should be positively 
correlated with FDI. It is a stylized fact in the empirical literature that trade vol-
umes between two countries are a function of both income levels of the two coun-
tries (GDP) and the distance between them. In a gravity model, the smaller the 
distance between two countries, the more they are expected to trade. Distance is a 
proxy for transportation costs, or (economic) barriers to trade. Following Deme-
kas et al. (2005), we compute weighted distance (W_DISTANCE) as the sum of 
bilateral distance to all source countries multiplied by the ratio of GDP of source 
country to all source countries’ GDP. In line with their study, we expect a negative 
correlation with FDI.
We also introduce a number of control variables, which capture the impact of 
global and country-specific effects on FDI. Our choice of control variables is led 
by FDI theory and it is based on well-established findings in the empirical litera-
18 We used general secondary education enrolment rate (EDUC) as an alternative proxy for the market demand 
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349ture (see section 2). These are real world GDP growth rate (WORLD_GDP), cre-
dit default swap spread (CDS), trade openness (import plus export as a percent of 
host country’s gross domestic product, TRADE), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), 
telecommunication (total telephone lines per 100 people, TELE), corporate tax 
burden (statutory corporate income tax rate, TAX), unit labour costs (ratio of 
monthly average gross wages to GDP per employment, ULC), corruption index 
(Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, COR), and credit 
risk (Moody’s Sovereign Credit Rating, CR_RISK).
In addition to the macroeconomic and political risk effects we introduce a group 
of factors that measure the level of the institutional quality in a host country. To 
summarize the information contained in these factors, we utilized principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA). PCA permits the reduction of the number of variables 
used in the estimation and yet retains a substantial part of the information con-
tained in the various variables. This strategy has been widely used in previous 
empirical studies (Calderón and Servén, 2004; Kumar, 2006). A detailed explana-
tion and the expected sign of each proxy variable included in the composite index 
(INSTIT) are presented in appendix B. Following Sinha (2012), we created a sec-
ond composite (socio-economic) variable (NAT_RES); this variable is used as a 
proxy for the availability of natural resources and the ability of the country to 
process these resources using technology and skill. It includes the following vari-
ables: gross fixed capital formation, gross domestic product, gross domestic prod-
uct per capita, gross domestic savings, and total natural resources rents (see ap-
pendix B).
To summarize our discussions on model variables and data sources, appendix A 
displays both dependent and explanatory variables and their expected impact on 
FDI. We use the correlation matrix of dependent and explanatory variables (avail-
able upon request) to examine the possible degree of collinearity among these 
variables. The explanatory variables used as proxies for policy and institutional 
risk effects (COR, CR_RISK and INSTIT) are highly correlated with the rest of 
the variables used in our regression analysis. Thus, we may expect that multicol-
linearity will be present in our model. To mitigate this problem these variables are 
included in the model specifications one at a time.
Table 1 displays the differences in the level of macroeconomic and institutional 
development between the group of top ten FDI performers and the rest of the 
countries in our sample. The data show that countries with large FDI dominance 
are characterized with well-developed macroeconomic, policy and institutional 
environment, while most of the countries in the second group are transition econ-
omies. This may explain the larger FDI flows to the first group of (more devel-
oped) EU countries and the relatively low FDI performance of the second group. 
We also run a simple t-test on the mean differences between the characteristics of 
the two groups of countries and find that for all but two variables the mean differ-
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4 modeL And econometrIc resuLts 
The use of panel regressions with both a time-series and a cross-country dimension, 
as opposed to a simple cross-section regression, allows a more sophisticated exami-
nation of country-specific effects. This study uses the following specification:
  ,  (1)
  ,
where FDIjt denotes FDI inflows to host country j at time t, FDIjt-1 is the lagged 
value of dependent variable, Yjt is a vector of traditional location variables, and Xjt 
is a vector of control (macroeconomic, policy and institutional) variables. Here εjt 
is an error term that includes the country-specific as well as time-specific effects. 
Table 1
T-tests on mean-differences
mean top 10 others difference(t-test)
FDI 4.19E+10 5.16E+09  9.79***
GDP_REAL 1.12E+12 1.13E+11 15.24***
POP 3.80E+07 7.10E+06 15.96***
W_DISTAN 5.28E+03 4.62E+03  6.02***
GDP_G 0.0232 0.0296 -2.17**
W_GDP 0.028 0.028 0.00
CDS 69.363 283.34  -2.75***
TRADE 0.989 1.035 -0.86
UNEMPL 0.087 0.092 -1.24
TELE 0.497 0.368 11.68***
TAX 0.337 0.25 12.31***
ULC 0.868 0.227 10.12***
COR 3.808 5.208  -7.85***
CR_RISK 18.772 14.718 14.08***
INSTIT 1.078 -0.688  9.85***
NAT_RES 1.496 -0.938 15.66***
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Data in table 1 represent the mean values of the dependant and explanatory variables for the 
 sample of top 10 countries in terms of FDI inflows and the rest of the sample, for the period of 
1994-2012. Total number of observations is 272. For some variables there are missing observa-
tions. The dependent variable is total FDI net inflows. The explanatory variables are Real GDP 
(GDP_R), Population (POP), Weighted distance (W_DISTAN), Growth in real GDP (GDP_G), Real 
world GDP growth rate (W_GDP), CDS spread (CDS), Trade openness (TRADE), Unemployment 
rate (UNEMPL), Infrastructure endowment (TELE), Corporate income tax rate (TAX), Unit labour 
costs (ULC), Corruption index (COR), Sovereign credit rating (CR_RISK), Institutional quality 
index (INSTIT), and Natural resources (NAT_RES). Time dummies for different major events 
(Eurozone and EU membership) are not included in the table. The table shows also the t-statis-
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351Time effects, γt, are usually modelled as fixed parameters as they are correlated 
with the gravity model variables. Including time fixed effects in the empirical 
model is one way to consider spatial autocorrelation in disturbances (Hansson and 
Olofsdotter, 2010). In order to explore the cross-sectional dimension of the panel 




this assumption requires the country-specific effects to be uncorrelated with the 
considered regressors, we will verify the latter condition by means of a Hausman 
test.19 Finally, ujt denotes the stochastic remainder disturbance term which we al-
low to suffer from heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of unknown forms. All 
regressions include year dummy (TIME) to control for time variation from cha-
nges in external economic environment common across sample countries.
The results for panel data regressions are presented in tables 2 through 6. The 
benchmark model is run for six different specifications. Table 2 shows the results 
for the total dataset of 26 EU countries (EU-15 and 11 CEE countries). The first 
column in table 2 displays the estimation results for our core model. In line with 
some recent studies on FDI in transition economies (Bellak et al., 2009; Hansson 
and Olofsdotter, 2010) we find that the coefficient of GDP variable is statistically 
significant and positive.20 With respect to other gravity variables in Model 1, the 
estimated coefficients of POP and DIST carry the expected signs but only the POP 
variable is marginally statistically significant at the 10 percent level. One possible 
explanation of why the distance variable enters the model insignificantly is that 
the main source countries of FDI to our sample countries are from Europe.21 
Growth in GDP used as a proxy for market demand also shows no significance in 
our analysis (see Model 1). Although the results of our pre-estimation tests indi-
cate there is no causality in the FDI-GDP relationship we decided to omit the 
GDP_G variable from the rest of our model specifications.
The control variables enter the empirical model statistically significantly except 
real world GDP growth rate. This variable proves to be insignificant in all model 
specifications and drops from models 2 through 6. The estimated coefficients of 
the rest of the control variables carry the expected signs. A positive estimate of the 
TRADE variable implies that countries with relatively liberal trade regimes cap-
ture disproportionately more FDI. It also indicates that a higher level of integra-
tion of the local economy into the regional economic flows impacts the FDI at-
tracted by this country positively. The positive and significant coefficient of the 
TELE variable signifies that, in general, countries with more favourable infra-
19 Hausman’s (1978) specification test enable us to test the hypothesis regarding the absence of correlation 
between the unobservable specific effects and the explanatory variables, and thereby, to consider the individ-
ual effects as random or fixed. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference in coefficients 
between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a small p-value (<0.05) sug-
gests the rejection of the random effects specification.
20 If the GDP coefficient is positive and significant this implies that foreign investors are indeed attracted to 
a large domestic market (market-seeking FDI). We also use GDP per capita as a proxy for the quality of the 
market demand in a host country and do find this variable significant in all model specifications.
21 When the GMM estimator is used (not reported here), the DIST variable proves to be marginally statisti-
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352 structure endowment attract more FDI. As expected, the unemployment rate and 
corporate income tax rate have negative impacts on FDI but only UNEMPL is 
strongly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on corporate 
tax rate displays a tax-rate elasticity of about -1.5. This result is in line with the 
meta-analysis of De Mooij and Everdeen (2008) who find a median tax-rate elas-
ticity of about -2.9 but this should be treated with caution because they use the 
effective average tax rate rather than the statutory tax rate. Finally, in line with 
Demekas et al. (2005), our analysis shows a marginally significant (and negative) 
impact of unit labour cost on FDI.
We also introduce a number of control variables that proxy for different political 
and institutional risk effects (see Model specifications 2 through 5). The estimated 
coefficients of COR, CR_RISK and INSTIT are statistically significant and with 
the expected signs. The NAT_RES variable used as a proxy for the availability of 
natural resources in a host country enters the model as insignificant. These find-
ings are not unexpected. The data in table 1 show that the largest amount of FDI 
is attracted by EU-15 countries (see also appendix C for the top 10 FDI perform-
ers), which are well developed economies with low levels of macroeconomic and 
political risk, and limited natural resources. At the same time CEE countries are 
characterized with a low degree of transparency and high bureaucratic risk that 
defer FDI. For these countries we expect variables such as corruption, credit risk 
and quality of institutions to play a significant role in explaining FDI. When coun-
try risk level is measured by the credit default swap spread (CDS), the results 
show a strong negative impact on FDI (see Model 1). 
Table 2 
FDI net inflows panel regressions (1994-2012), total sample
explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
FE FE FE FE FE FE
GDP_REAL   3.513**(0.010)
   2.064***
(0.000)
   2.464***
(0.000)
   2.341***
(0.000)
   1.929***
(0.004)



























































   3.322***
(0.001)
   3.723***
(0.000)
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353explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6


























CR_RISK    0.089***
(0.004)





























(overall) 0.288 0.274 0.299 0.292 0.310 0.280
Number of 
observations 183 342 347 347 324 347
Notes: Model 1 includes gravity variables (GDP, POP and WEIGHTED DISTANCE), world and 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP_G, WORLD_GDP, CDS, TRADE, UNEMPL, 
TELE, TAX and ULC). Models 2 through 5 include policy and institutional risk variables (COR, 
CR_RISK, INSTIT and NAT_RES). Models 1 through 6 include also lagged value of the dependent 
variable (FDI). Table 2 shows FE specification for each model based on Hausman’s test results. 
All variables (expect FDI, GDP and POP) are taken as ratios or in percent. 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
P-values are shown in brackets. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference 
in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a 
small p-value (<0.05) suggests the rejection of the random effects specification.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
We also introduce the lagged value of the dependent variable (FDI) in all model 
specifications. The positive sign of this variable shows that countries with a larger 
stock of FDI will also, ceteris paribus, have an advantage in attracting new invest-
ment compared to countries with a smaller stock. All model specifications include 
a time dummy to control for different time periods (before the financial crisis of 
2008 and after that); the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically signifi-
cant only in Model 1.
The results achieved so far show that there is a set of gravity and traditional (loca-
tion) factors common across different groups of European countries (EU-15 and 
CEE countries) that explain FDI flows to these countries. Thus, we find strong 
evidence in support of our first hypothesis. Although the two groups of countries 
are geographically closer and share similar market features, one may expect them 
to have different kinds of attractiveness to foreign investors. Looking at them as a 
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354 and other effects on FDI that are cross-correlated to these same factors. Thus, us-
ing separate samples makes it possible to analyze whether the motives for FDI 
differ across EU-15 and CEE countries. Another advantage of using separate sam-
ples is that it reduces the correlation between the explanatory variables. Basically, 
the same specifications as for the total sample are used. The results for the groups 
of EU-15 and CEE countries are presented in tables 3 and 4. 
Model 1 in table 3 shows that the gravity variables (except distance) enter the 
model statistically significantly. While GDP and POP variables show strong posi-
tive impact on FDI in all model specifications, the DISTANCE variable remains 
insignificant. Similarly to the total sample GDP_G variable and real world GDP 
growth rate are not statistically significant. Including macroeconomic factors as 
control variables yields results similar to those for the total sample. All but two 
variables (unemployment and tax rates) show a significant impact on FDI flows 
into the group of EU-15. In the next few models we control for different political 
and institutional risk effects. COR, CR_RISK and NAT_RES variables are all 
found to have a statistically significant impact on FDI. The results in table 3 show 
that more developed European countries with a larger stock of FDI will have no 
advantage in attracting new investments compared to countries with a smaller 
stock; the estimated coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. All model 
specifications in table 3 include time dummies for the years 1999 and 2002 to 
control for Eurozone membership effect.22 The estimated coefficients for year 
2002 are statistically significant, which confirms our expectation that, in general, 
Eurozone membership plays an important role in attracting more FDI into the 
group of EU-15 countries but its immediate effect may be negative for some EU 
countries (year 2002 dummy is negative).23
22 The euro currency was launched alongside EU national currencies in 1999 but physical notes and coins that 
replaced all national currencies came into existence in 2002. For more details see: http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Eurozone#Member_states.
23 There is no way of saying whether the 2002 dummy is negative due to Eurozone membership or maybe 
there are other factors that affect FDI flows in that particular year (2002).
Table 3 
FDI net inflows panel regressions (1994-2012), EU-15 sub-sample
explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
FE FE FE FE FE FE
GDP_REAL   8.341**(0.029)
   5.559***
(0.000)
   5.540***
(0.000)
   5.217***
(0.000)
   4.669***
(0.002)
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355explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
FE FE FE FE FE FE
CDS   -0.270**(0.015)























TELE    8.292***(0.005)
   3.710***
(0.004)
   3.912***
(0.002)





























COR   -0.399**
(0.018)


































(overall) 0.291 0.295 0.298 0.275 0.307 0.272
Number of 
observations 91 210 210 210 197 210
Notes: Model 1 includes gravity variables (GDP, POP and WEIGHTED DISTANCE), world and 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP_G, WORLD_GDP, CDS, TRADE, UNEMPL, 
TELE, TAX and ULC). Models 2 through 5 include policy and institutional risk variables (COR, 
CR_RISK, INSTIT and NAT_RES). Models 1 through 6 include also lagged value of the dependent 
variable (FDI). Table 3 shows FE specification for each model based on Hausman’s test results. 
All variables (expect FDI, GDP and POP) are taken as ratios or in percent. 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
P-values are shown in brackets. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference 
in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a 
small p-value (<0.05) suggests the rejection of the random effects specification.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Next, the benchmark model (1) is run for the sub-sample of CEE countries (see 
table 4). The results support our first hypothesis that there is a set of traditional 
factors (market size, trade openness, unemployment and tax rate) that are common 
FDI determinants across different groups of European countries. At the same time 
we find a number of country-specific factors significant only for the group of CEE 
countries. For example, unlike the total and EU-15 samples, growth in real GDP 
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356 ports Suder and Sohn (2010) finding that the fast economic growth of CEE coun-
tries during the last two decades plays an important role in increasing the attrac-
tiveness of this group of economies for foreign investors. Surprisingly, the unit 
labour cost (ULC) variable is not found to have a significant impact on FDI flows 
into the group of CEE countries; the estimated coefficient is negative but statisti-
cally insignificant. This result is inconsistent with previous empirical studies (see 
Bellak et al., 2008; Demekas et al., 2005) that consistently reveal negative sig-
nificant effects of labour costs on FDI; yet this effect should be interpreted with 
caution, as a positive sign for unit labour costs is also possible, if they actually 
capture a higher skill level and higher per capita income.
Table 4 
FDI net inflows panel regressions (1994-2012), CEECs sub-sample
explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6



















































































































   0.246***
(0.008)
   0.249***
(0.007)
   0.265***
(0.005)
   0.259***
(0.005)
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357explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
FE FE FE FE FE FE
TIME(2007)   0.605**
(0.049)
   0.726***
(0.002)
   0.702***
(0.003)
   0.689***
(0.004)
   0.664***
(0.005)
   0.731***
(0.002)
R-squared 
(overall) 0.458 0.456 0.485 0.486 0.525 0.472
Number of 
observations 92 132 137 137 127 137
Notes: Model 1 includes gravity variables (GDP, POP and WEIGHTED DISTANCE), world and 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP_G, WORLD_GDP, CDS, TRADE, UNEMPL, 
TELE, TAX and ULC). Models 2 through 5 include policy and institutional risk variables (COR, 
CR_RISK, INSTIT and NAT_RES). Models 1 through 6 include also lagged value of the depend-
ent variable (FDI). Table 4 shows FE specification for each model based on Hausman’s test 
results. The PRIV variable is automatically omitted from the FE model specifications. By con-
struction, the FE estimator drops variables which are time invariant. With the RE estimator, the 
PRIV variable is positive and statistically significant in model specifications 1, 3 and 6. All vari-
ables (expect FDI, GDP and POP) are taken as ratios or in percent. 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
P-values are shown in brackets. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference 
in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a 
small p-value (<0.05) suggests the rejection of the random effects specification.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
One may expect that unlike the EU-15 sample, variables such as corruption and 
quality of institutions will have a significant impact on FDI in transition econo-
mies. We do find that two of the control variables that proxy political and institu-
tional risk effects (CR_RISK and INSTIT) enter the model statistically signifi-
cantly. Thus, we provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that policy and 
institutional quality factors are indeed able to explain the differences in attractive-
ness among CEE countries for foreign investors. We may expect that transition 
effects will be more pronounced at the level of business entities (through privati-
zation or other phenomena) than on a country-specific level. To confirm or reject 
this hypothesis we also run the model with a dummy variable (PRIV) indicating 
the perceived quality of the method of privatization followed by the recipient 
(host) country.24 In line with previous research (see Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; 
Holland and Pain, 1998), we do find evidence that the method of privatization has 
a strong impact on the level of foreign investment in the transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe.25 The estimated coefficient for lagged value of FDI 
also proves to be positive and statistically significant. All model specifications 
include time dummies for the years 2004 and 2007 to control for EU membership 
effects. Of the two variables only the 2007 dummy shows a strong positive impact 
24 The variable is constructed on the same basis as Holland and Pain (1998), where sales to outside owners 
receive the highest quality rating, while voucher distribution and management-employee buyouts receive the 
lowest rating.
25 The PRIV variable is automatically omitted from the FE model specifications. By construction, the FE esti-
mator drops variables which are time invariant. With the RE estimator, the PRIV variable is positive and sta-
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358 on FDI. We may conclude that the announcement effect of EU membership of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 did play a positive role in attracting more foreign 
investments in this region. 
In the previous section, we asked the question if there are top FDI performers 
among the European countries, and if this is the case, what factors may explain the 
FDI dominance of this group of countries over the rest of the countries in our 
sample. To answer this question, we rank all the countries in our sample based on 
the index of relative dominance of FDI flows (Sinha, 2012) and split them into 
two groups – top ten FDI performers and the rest of the countries (see appendix 
C). Then, we run the benchmark model (1) for each of these two sub-samples to 
investigate if FDI determinants are similar across the two groups. The results are 
reported in tables 5 and 6. As expected, we find that traditional (location) factors 
such as gross domestic product, credit default risk, telecommunications, and tax 
rate have similar effects on FDI across the two groups of performers. In contrast, 
the unit labour costs (ULC) variable shows significant impact on FDI only in the 
group of countries with low FDI dominance (most of these countries are transition 
economies), while variables such as UNEMPL and TELE are found to have larger 
effect in the group of top ten FDI performers. For this group of more developed 
EU economies the world GDP growth rate also plays a significant role in attract-
ing more FDI, especially in periods of strong economic development. 
Table 5 
FDI net inflows panel regressions (1994-2012), Top 10 sub-sample
explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6





























































   -7.259***
(0.007)
   -7.236***
(0.008)




TELE    8.338***(0.003)
  3.918**
(0.016)
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359explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6












































(overall) 0.425 0.312 0.321 0.319 0.312 0.308
Number of 
observations 72 149 149 149 140 149
Notes: Model 1 includes gravity variables (GDP, POP and WEIGHTED DISTANCE), world and 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP_G, WORLD_GDP, CDS, TRADE, UNEMPL, 
TELE, TAX and ULC). Models 2 through 5 include policy and institutional risk variables (COR, 
CR_RISK, INSTIT and NAT_RES). Models 1 through 6 include also lagged value of the dependent 
variable (FDI). Table 5 shows FE specification for each model based on Hausman’s test results. 
All variables (expect FDI, GDP and POP) are taken as ratios or in percent. 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
P-values are shown in brackets. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference 
in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a 
small p-value (<0.05) suggests the rejection of the random effects specification.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
When analyzing the impact of political and institutional risk factors on FDI we do 
find some differences between the two groups of countries. The top ten FDI per-
formers are able to attract significant amount of FDI due to their political and 
macroeconomic stability, as well as the high transparency of their legal regula-
tions. Thus, we do not find the variables that proxy these policy and institutional 
effects to have a significant influence on FDI. For the group of countries with low 
FDI dominance, both credit risk and quality of institutions are found to be signifi-
cant determinants of FDI. These findings are not unexpected. The countries that 
belong to the second group are economies with less developed policy and institu-
tional environments; as said before labour costs in these countries appear to be 
relatively low, so it is likely that they are able to attract predominantly efficiency-
seeking FDI from MNEs in countries that have higher labour costs. Thus, our 
second hypothesis is confirmed. The time dummy variable used to control for the 
2008 crisis effect proves to be statistically insignificant for both groups of FDI 
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360 Table 6 
FDI net inflows panel regressions (1994-2012), others sub-sample
explanatory 
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
FE FE FE FE FE FE
GDP_REAL  4.005*(0.053)
   3.081***
(0.000)
   3.046***
(0.000)































































































































(overall) 0.319 0.321 0.337 0.348 0.364 0.325
Number of 
observations 111 193 198 198 184 198
Notes: Model 1 includes gravity variables (GDP, POP and WEIGHTED DISTANCE), world and 
country-specific macroeconomic variables (GDP_G, WORLD_GDP, CDS, TRADE, UNEMPL, 
TELE, TAX and ULC). Models 2 through 5 include policy and institutional risk variables (COR, 
CR_RISK, INSTIT and NAT_RES). Models 1 through 6 include also lagged value of the dependent 
variable (FDI). Table 5 shows FE specification for each model based on Hausman’s test results. 
All variables (expect FDI, GDP and POP) are taken as ratios or in percent. 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
P-values are shown in brackets. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the difference 
in coefficients between fixed effects and random effects specifications is not systematic. Thus a 
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3615 concLusIon
The analysis presented in this paper has enabled identification of several key de-
terminants of FDI flows into Western and Eastern European countries, and high-
lighted the significance of different policy and institutional factors for the attrac-
tiveness of these countries for foreign investors. By using both traditional and 
more specific variables and a longer period (1994-2012), we extend the previous 
research work on FDI, which focuses mainly on European Union countries as a 
homogeneous group of economies. Our research provides additional support to 
the common view that the traditional location factors (GDP, population, trade 
openness, unemployment, infrastructure endowment, tax rate and unit labour 
costs) are important determinants of FDI into different European countries. At the 
same time we find that country-specific characteristics such as economic growth, 
unit labour costs, and credit risk contribute to the differences in the FDI pattern 
across EU-15 and CEE countries. Policy and institutional quality factors also play 
an important role in explaining the increasing attractiveness of both groups of 
countries for foreign investors.
The results of an analysis of indicate that market-seeking motives (proxied by 
GDP, population and trade openness) are important drivers of FDI to all European 
countries. Investigating the importance of FDI motives for EU-15 and CEE coun-
tries as separate groups shows that efficiency-seeking motives (proxied by infra-
structure endowment) have significant effect on FDI in both regions, while growth 
in GDP, unemployment and tax rates seem to influence FDI only in the group of 
CEE countries. In line with previous empirical research (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; 
Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Holland and Pain, 1998; Stoian and Filippaios, 
2007), the explanatory variables that purport to measure the significance of policy 
and institutional environment such as corruption, credit risk, and quality of institu-
tions are found to have a significant influence on FDI in Europe. When total sam-
ple is divided into two sub-samples (EU-15 and 11 CEE countries) this effect re-
mains strong; while quality of institutions seems to be important FDI determinant 
only in the group of CEE countries, natural resource availability is a significant 
factor for more developed EU-15 countries. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the only paper that investigates the marginal 
effect of macroeconomic, policy and institutional quality factors on FDI in differ-
ent European countries based on their relative performance. We ranked all the 
countries in our sample based on the index of relative dominance of FDI flows and 
investigated the factors that determine FDI in each group. Our results show that 
the top ten FDI performers are able to attract significant amount of FDI because of 
their macroeconomic stability and high level of institutional development. For the 
group of countries with low FDI dominance we find that policy and institutional 
quality factors have strong explanatory power; credit risk and quality of institu-
tions are significant determinants of FDI. Our findings have strong policy implica-
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362 efforts should be directed to creating stable political and institutional environ-
ments, as well as appropriate incentives for foreign investors.
Unfortunately, the research does have some limitations. In the first place, we were 
not able to differentiate the origin of FDI in our sample (in case of the EU-15). 
Thus, we have been limited in our analysis on the expected (negative) impact of 
distance (as a location factor) on FDI attractiveness for different groups of Euro-
pean countries. In addition, the empirical results are derived from a sample of 
transition economies, which include only new EU member states. Thus, the study 
will improve if candidate member states (e.g., Macedonia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro) are included in the analysis. This will 
help us investigate the role of different macroeconomic, policy and institutional 
factors in explaining FDI flows attracted by countries at different stages of transi-
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363AppendIx A
To summarize the discussions on model variables and data sources, the table be-
low displays both dependent and explanatory variables and their expected impact 
on FDI. The observation period is 1994-2012. Time dummies for different major 
events (Eurozone and EU membership effects) are also included in the table.
Table a1 
Dependent and explanatory variables
variable explanation data source expected sign
Dependent variable
FDI
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(BoP, current US$). The data is annual  
and covers the period 1994-2012
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014)
Explanatory variables
GDP_REAL Real gross domestic product  
(in 2005 US$), proxy for market size
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014)
+





Weighted distance calculated as the sum  
of bilateral distance to all source countries 
multiplied by the ratio of GDP of source 
country in year t to all source countries’ 
GDP in year t
WIIW Database (2014), 
OECD (2014)
–
GDP_G Annual real growth rate in GDP,  proxy for market demand




GDP Historical World GDP Growth Rate
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014), 
International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF 
(2014)
+




Level of imports plus exports (in US$)  
of the host country as a percentage of its 
GDP (in US$), proxy for trade openness
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014)
+
UNEMPL Unemployment rate, proxy for macroeconomic stability
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014)
–
TELE Telephone lines (per 100 people),  proxy for infrastructure endowment






TAX Statutory corporate income tax rates,  proxy for macroeconomic stability
Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2010), 
Edwards and Mitchell 
(2008), Keen, Kim,  
and Varsano (2006), 
KPMG’s Corporate and 
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364 variable explanation data source expected sign
Explanatory variables
ULC
Gross monthly wages in current US$,  
as share of GDP per employment,  
proxy for unit labour costs




Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (TI), on a continuous 
scale from 0 (squeaky clean) to 10 (highly 






Moody’s Sovereign Credit Rating,  
on a continuous scale from 0 (the lowest 
possible rating) to 20 (maximum 
creditworthiness), proxy for political risk
Moody’s (2014) +
INSTIT
First principal component of control of 
corruption, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 




First principal component of gross fixed 
capital formation, gross domestic product, 
gross domestic product per capita, gross 
domestic savings and total natural 
resources rents
World Bank  
(WDI Database, 2014)
+
TIME Temporal (year) dummy
A dummy used to 
control for different 


































































38 (3) 337-374 (2014)
365AppendIx b
In order to summarize the information contained in many socio-economic factors 
we use principal component analysis (PCA). This permits the reduction of the 
number of variables used in the estimation and yet still retains a substantial part of 
the information contained. We perform PCA using the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and several other variables used as proxies for nat-
ural resources availability following Sinha (2012). We estimate the first principal 
component using the component variables listed below and create two new inde-
pendent variables – INSTIT and NAT_RES. The former is a proxy for the overall 
institutional quality in a host country and the latter is a proxy for the availability 
of natural resources and the ability of the country to process these resources using 
technology and skill.
Table b1 
Component variables of INSTIT and NAT_RES




Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 




Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 




Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies.
+
Regulatory quality
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development.
+
Rule of law
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 




Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
+
nAt_res
Gross fixed  
capital formation
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, 
and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial 
and industrial buildings. According to the 1993 SNA, net 
acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. 
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GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 




GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 




Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final 
consumption expenditure (total consumption). 




Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. +
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367AppendIx c
To study FDI dominance among the countries in our sample we compute the Index 
of Rank Dominance (IRD) as outlined in Bhanu Murthy (2011). Based on this 
Index we separate the total sample into two sub-samples: Top 10 performers and 







is the Index of Rank Dominance; 
Rank Score is 26, 25, 24, .., 2, 1 (in decreasing order of rank); 
No. of years is 19. 
We also present the Relative Index of Rank Dominance (RIRD) which provides a 




Index of Rank Dominance of FDI Inflows for the sample of 26 EU countries during 
the period 1994-2012
rank country score Ird rIrd
 1 United Kingdom 468 0.9853 0.0530
 2 Luxembourg 456 0.9589 0.0516
 3 France 445 0.9358 0.0503
 4 Spain 390 0.8924 0.0480
 5 Belgium 415 0.8737 0.0470
 6 Germany 395 0.8662 0.0466
 7 Poland 305 0.8449 0.0454
 8 Italy 317 0.8342 0.0449
 9 Netherlands 366 0.8026 0.0432
10 Sweden 338 0.7735 0.0416
11 Czech Republic 244 0.7625 0.0410
12 Portugal 221 0.7270 0.0391
13 Latvia  80 0.7018 0.0377
14 Ireland 267 0.6679 0.0359
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368 rank country score Ird rIrd
16 Finland 213 0.6594 0.0355
17 Hungary 260 0.6516 0.0350
18 Greece 141 0.6184 0.0333
19 Austria 259 0.6184 0.0333
20 Croatia 139 0.6096 0.0328
21 Romania 196 0.6068 0.0326
22 Slovakia 137 0.6009 0.0323
23 Lithuania  79 0.5197 0.0279
24 Bulgaria 157 0.5164 0.0278
25 Estonia  94 0.4947 0.0266
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